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The link between psychoanalysis and writing is inextri~
cable, especially since psychoanalytic theory both explains
and justifies itself through analogies with writing. In particu
lar, I wish to examine two such analogies: the textual analogy
of the psyche's content in Freud's Interpretation ofDreams and
the writing machine analogy of the psyche's structure in
Freud's Note on the 'Mystic Writing Pad'. The ramifications of
using the written text as a paradigm to explain psychical
behavior affects theories of how writing produces meaning,
of how the psyche negotiates its own textual nature and how
this textual basis of psychoanalysis effects the institutional
nature of psychoanalytic practice. I wish to focus on the
relation between writing and the interpretation of psychical
phenomena at their j oint intersection with history by looking
at three readings of Freud by Derrida, de Certeau and
Deleuze/Guattari. In brief, the following question will be
considered: how does writing produce meaning and what
does this historicizing function imply about the psyche in
general?
Even a cursory glance at Freud's dream interpretation
reveals a unique approach. Freud both uses his own dreams
as scientific material and refuses to refer to a fixed universal
key of translation. It is the latter that allows Freud to provide
an innovative explanation of the relation between the signi
fier and the signified in dreams. As Derrida points out:
The absence of an exhaustive and absolutely infallible
code means that in psychic writing which thus prefig
ures the meaning of writing in general, the difference
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between signifier and signified is never radical.
(Derrida 210)
Indeed, Freud further suggests that dreams completelyeman
cipate the signifier from the signified. This results in the
treatment of words as things in themselves to the extent that
words and plays on words are almost solely responsible for
conveying meaning. However this treatment of signifiers
immediately poses a problem for translating dreams. If the
signifiers in dreams manufacture their own significance, the
very arbitrariness of this production resists the possibility of
translation. This is because translation requires a permanent
code enabling the substitution or transformation of signifiers
while retaining the same signified, always present. despite the
absence of any specific signifier" (Derrida 210). It is clear that
object of contention is the presupposed presence of meaning
itself. On a prima facie level, by postulating both latent and
manifest contents Freud seems to follow the paradigm of
translation: transforming the latent signifiers into manifest
signifiers which better express the always present but buried
meaning which persists through the substitution game.
However, a closer look at Freud's project reveals something
different. The meaning of dreams does not so much satisfy
the checklist of metaphysical attributes of immutability 
enduring presence, atemporality, unity - but is itself a pro
duction and hence fundamentally historical. This interpreta
tion of Freud, somewhat against his intentions but without
betraying him, now needs to be validated.
The motivation for postulating a two-tiered conception
of meaning itself follows from Freud's conviction that mani
fest meanings are generally deliberate distortions which
dissimulate the wishes that the dreamers want to but are
'uncomfortable with' fulfilling. Freud first explainS the psy
chical basis for such dissimulation via an analogy with writ
ers. Dream wishes are like books whose meaning needs to be
distorted to circumvent political censorship. One notable
feature of this analogy is that Freud distinguishes between
oral and written pronouncements. Oral pronouncements are
1/
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repressed after they have been spoken and so exhibit silence
rather than distortion whereas written pronouncements are
suppressed beforehand if they intend to make it into print.
Thus, the "stricter the [social] censorship, the more far
reaching will be the disguise and the more ingenious the
means employed for putting the reader on the scent of the
true meaning" (Freud 224). With this analogy, Freud not only
abrogates individual/social distinctions by using social phe
nomena to explain matters of the individual psyche but he
also privileges the written text over the phonetic one as the
closest approximation of the human psyche.
For Derrida, this is crucial. It evinces a radical departure
from the logocentric nostalgia which privileges speech as
unmediated (logos as both words and reason; particularly
the Christian adaptation of logos for the original Word,
uniting word and deed in completeness and self-sufficiency)
over writing as a mediated and hence corrupted, 'after the
fact' supplement to the original meaning. If Freud conceives
the psyche as a written text, then he already sees it as
deferring the originally intended meaning. Moreover if
repression precedes articulation, then all meaning and subse
quently all understanding of ourselves is always already a
dissimulation and interpretation. It is always historical and
never original. Freud himself further validates this view of
the historicized unconscious by describing the self as initially
fractured and fundamentally plural. Dream distortion, like
all conscious thought, is the handiwork of two agencies
whereby the distressing dreams do in fact contain some
thing which is distressing to the second agency, but some
thing which at the same time fulfills a wish on the part of the
first agency" (Freud 228). Thus, the basic epistemic unit of
Freudian psychology, the individual, consists of two mutu
ally conflicting agents instead of the unified Kantian indi
vidual which is the basis of enlightenment views of con
sciousness. Instead of Kant's transcendental subject (who is
the fixed, unified organizer of his sensations) Freud empha
sizes the irrational. the unseen, the involuntary controlling
the voluntary. In short, everything outside the scientific
II
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domain of reason. Not only does Freud render the passions
as motive agents, he also considers language as the joint
production of desire and force. Desire expresses itself textu
ally to bypass self-censorship. Writing is born out of desire's
repression and so too is always originally repressed.
Derrida explains the significance of considering meaning
as the differential between the two forces of desire and
repression:
There is no present text in general and there is not
even a past present text, a text which is past as having
been present. The textis not conceivable in an originary
or modified form of presence. The unconscious text
is already a weave ofpure traces, differences in which
force and meaning are united - a text nowhere present,
consisting of archives which are always already tran
scriptions. Originaryprints. Everything begins with
production. Always already: repositories of meaning
which was never present, whose signified presence
was always reconstituted by deferral. (Derrida 211)
There is no present text because repression (the social censor)
always defers and by deferral produces meaning. The
'originary prints', then, are the product of two actions. Be
cause meaI').ing is only articulated after repression, it is al
ways already deferred (desire only achieves articulation
through negotiation with the censor). Furthermore, the
'uncorrupted', 'original' presence of desire is always recon
stituted by this deferral; it is interpreted or produced and not
uncovered in its unadulterated state. Freud has thus
historicized Kant's transcendental subject. Since we are
initially plural and self-alienated, we also possess an inner
historicity. Our own existence and self-knowledge is not
something freely articulated but through its original defor
mation implies a production of meaning.
Both the pervasiveness of this deferral as well as Freud's
task of founding a discourse out of the nonverbal interaction
of psychic forces is encapsulated in his treatment of rhetorical
figures. Rhetorical figures in their capacity as constitutive
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components of meaning are themselves events (hence his
torical) by which deformation creates gaps between what is
desired, the expression of this desire and its fulfillment. In
one of Freud's dreams he realizes that "the wish to go to
Rome had become in my dream -like a cloak and symbol for
a number of other passionate wishes" (Freud 285). The
manifest content is here explicitly identified with the appar
ently concurrent rhetorical figures of symbol and veil. But for
something to qualify as a symbol (as opposed to being a
trivial and hence negligible statement) is to confront us with
the history of its effects. Thus although the symbol confronts
us, it also masks the process by which it gains its importance
and why it is meaningful in the first place.
According to de Certeau, this symbol/ mask duality is"at
the heart of Freudian discoveries - the return of the re
pressed" (de Certeau 3). Indeed he states that this 'mecha
nism':
is linked to a certain conception of time and memory,
according to which consciousness is both the decep
tive mask and operative trace of events that organize
the present. (de Certeau 3)
Thus the symbol is both an archive of the differences between
memories forgotten and remembered (why it is meaningful
in the first place) - this is the operative trace - and the violence
done to meaning to ensure its permanence - this is the
deceptive mask. If we define the symbol as a special kind of
sign that has practically effaced its referent, we approach
Freud' 5 notion of condensation. For example, in the dream
about Irma's injection, Freud interprets Irma as a condensed
figure who stands for many people: his daughter, the patient
who succumbed to poisoning, his wife, her friend. Irma has
become the collective image for people who had been sacri
ficed to the work of condensation" (Freud 406). On the one
hand, the use of 'sacrifice' indicates a violence done to mean
ing - a dissimulation. On the other hand, the condensation
creates a proliferation of signifiers because such multiple
/I
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determination makes it easier for an element to force its way
into the dream-content" (Freud 402). This, at least theoreti
cally, implies an infinity of interpretations. Aninfinitywhich
too has been sacrificed for the sake of intelligibility. In this
sense, the intelligibility of the present, its ability to explain
itself to itself "takes the place of the history lost to it"; both
because its meaningfulness is itself derived from a dissimu
lation of meaning (the violence done to meaning in order to
communicate it) and because intelligibility itself is based on
a system of exclusion (de Certeau 29b). Thus, not only is the
present itself always reconstituted by deferral (the original
violence which communicates meaning) but itself must colo
nize and empty out the past in order to retain its clarity.
The same implications hold for displacement, the other
rhetorical figure Freud emphasizes. The consequence of the
displacement is that the dream-content no longer resembles
the core of dream-thought and that the dream gives no more
than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the
unconscious" (Freud 417). Distortion is the type of manifes
tation (dream-content) which is a disguise, a willful substi
tute which nevertheless fulfills the dream-thought in its
fictive, hence rhetorical sphere. However, if the psychic
structure of desire and repression is universal, then all articu
lation of desire will need to circumvent repressive censorship
and so will always be removed from the desire it wishes to
articulate. This vitiates the possibility of anyone approach
ing a finalist interpretation of latent meaning. The two
rhetorical figures of condensation and displacement are cru
cial in interpreting the textual fabric of the psyche; both are
figures that are not self-evident but require a reading. Con
densation in its near equivocation with symbols implies a
reading concomitant with the rhetoric of optics; its heraldic
qualities require a fine-tuned gaze; whereas displacement
implies a complex grammar of interpretation.
This rhetoric of optics crucially demonstrates how Freud
once again privileges the written over phonetic language,
One way Freud emphasizes the written text is by comparing
the dream-content with a pictographic script (Freud 381-2).
1/

74

SANJA PEROVIC

Words in their capacity as pictures can mean many contradic
tory things at once. As Derrida points out, this is in contrast
with phonetic writing which necessarily relies on linear
execution, always moves"from presentto presentpoint" and
so remains in II profound complicity with logos (or the time of
logic) which is dominated by the principle of noncontradic
tion, the cornerstone of all metaphysics of presence" (Derrida
217). Freud's allegiance to nonphoneticwriting, particularly
emphasized in its resistance of all logical relations and linear
unfoldings of narrative, is further exposed in the following
paragraph:
The different portions of this complicated structure
stand, of course, in the most manifold logical rela
tions to one another. They can represent foreground
and background, digressions and illustrations, con
ditions, chains of evidence and counter-arguments.
When the whole mass of these dream-thoughts is
brought under the pressure of the dream-work, and
its elements are turned about, broken into fragments
and jammed together - almost like pack-ice - the
question arises of what happens to the logical connec
tions which have hitherto formed its framework.
What representation do dreams provide for 'if', 'be
cause', 'just as', 'although', 'either-or', and all the
other conjunctions without which we cannot under
stand sentences or speeches? (Freud 422)
Aside from the spatialization or optical representation
associated with referring to dream-content as pack-ice and
hence circumvention of this 'time of logic', we have here a
most peculiar situation. The crux of the Freudian position is
that the unconscious causes certain conscious behaviors. But
here, Freud insists that the whole causal contribution of the
unconscious to understanding our desires is not immanent
within the dream-content. Instead our discursive under
standing interprets the unconscious, this pack-ice, as caus
ally efficacious. For example, whereas the dream-content is
Jand', 'and', 'and' ad infinitum we substitute 'either', 'or',
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'because' etc. In other words, every narrative history, even
the personal biography of the analysand involves attributing
a motivation and causallinks which are not immanent in the
unconscious. For scientific purposes this has a two-fold
significance: first it exposes how causal and logical connec
tions used in constructing historical narrative are substitu
tions, interpretations; in short, fictions and second implies
that the unconscious can never be conceptualized in its
original state because understanding it is always already an
interpretation. So far, however, Freud has only elucidated
various characteristics of the psyche's content by comparing
dreams with texts and rhetorical figures. Now, I will turn to
the Mystic Writing Pad to investigate another textual meta
phor which, this time, will express the structure or how the
psyche works.
Freud begins his exposition by delineating the merits and
limitations of two forms of writing: paper-pen and chalk
slate. Although the advantage of paper-pen writing lies in its
ability to maintain a 'permanent trace' the receptive capacity
of the writing surface is finite, easily exhaustible and cannot
lose whatever trace has been inscribed on it. The chalk-slate
method, on the contrary, both has a receptive capacity for an
unlimited time" and can erase the memory traces which have
become uninteresting and obsolete. It, however, suffers the
reverse of the paper-pen method, namely its complete inabil
ity to maintain a permanent trace (Freud 227b). But with the
invention of the mystic writing pad, Freud finds an appara
tus which has If an unlimited capacity for new perceptions
and nevertheless lays down permanent - even though not
unalterable - memory-traces of them" (Freud 228b). Freud
describes the functioning of the pad:
I

To make use of the Mystic Pad, one writes upon the
celluloid portion of the covering-sheet which rests on
the wax slab. For this purpose no pencil or chalk is
necessary, since the writing does not depend on the
material being deposited on the receptive surfac.e ...a
pointed stilus scratches the surface, the depressIOns
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upon which constitute the 'writing' ...If one wishes to
destroy what has been written, all that is necessary is
to raise the double covering-sheet from the wax slab
by a light pulL.the close contact between the waxed
paper and the wax slab at the places where it has been
scratched (upon which the visibility of the writing
depended) is thus brought to an end and does not
recur when the two surfaces come together once
more. (Freud 229b)
This apparatus corresponds with remarkable precision to
Freud's radically dualistic model of consciousness. The
system Pcpt-Cs (analogous to the covering sheet) receives
perceptions but in order for it to Hreact like a clean sheet to
each new perception" it retains no permanent trace (Freud
22Sb). Instead the retention of the permanent traces is a
function of the mnemic systems which lies behind the per
ceptual system (analogous to the wax slab) and receive the
trace of inscription. Already two important aspects emerge;
first the psychical system consists of two separate but inter
related systems thus once again affirming an original plural
ity in our psychical constitution and second this psychical
dualism itself implies that the depth of the Mystic Pad is
simultaneously a depth without bottom, an infinite allusion
and a perfectly superficial exteriority" (Derrida 227). In other
words, this contraption allows for both a potentially infinite
depth of implied meaning and the endless accretion of trace
in the' deep' but limitless unconscious which lies behind the
perception. It is a potentially infinite writing of the present
(one can write on the celluloid ad infinitum) while simulta
neously avoiding foundationalist pretenses (each system
functions separately but in tandem: there is no first innocence
in consciousness; to be conscious is to be, from the beginning,
plural). Another important implication is that the ability to
lift the celluloid and erase the writing is just as integral as the
permanent traces which remain on the wax slab. Indeed, it
seems tha t the psychical structure (and analogously writing)
is contingent both on the contact between the celluloid and
wax slab and the lifting of this contact which erases percep
U
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tion and cleanses the receptive surface to receive sensory data
anew. Memory functions to retain the trace of all these
present moments. Further, memory points to the differences
in what we perceive. It retains the difference between what
perceptions are written down, engraved as trace and what
perceptions permeate our consciousness without notice. Thus,
not only are perceptions themselves cathected in that the
only perceptions to contact with the receptive surface are
those which interest us, but, derivatively, memory only
retains traces of those perceptions cathected in the first place.
Because perception is already an inscription on the celluloid,
it follows that the "perceived may be read only in the past,
beneath perception and after it" (Derrida 224). What we are
actually conscious of perceiving is the cathected perceptions
inscribed on our receptive system. Thus, the 'perceived' is
always initially delayed. This explains Derrida's claim that
IJ memory or writing is the opening of that process of appear
ance itself" (Derrida 224). Appearance itself is contingent on
the writing and memory traces which by differentiating
perceptions create the conditions for the appearance.
Freud next continues his analogy by comparing the ac
tual breaking of contact which o,ccurs when the writing stops
in the Mystic Writing Pad" with the IJ periodic, non-excitabil
ity of the perceptual system" (Freud 225b). Freud postulates
that consciousness functions as a series of periodic, discon
tinuous "cathectic innervations as if the "unconscious
stretches out feelers ...towards the external world and hastily
withdraws them" (Freud 231b). This periodic discontinuity
has several important ramifications. First, on the Freudian
schema the essence of our consciousness does not lie outside
of time such as the Cartesian cogito, Plato's forms or other
classic, timeless specimens. Second, this implies a heteroge
neous, discontinuous concept of time rather than the homo
geneous time typical of historiographic writing. Time is not
an empty, homogeneous volume through which we progress
historically in a smooth continuum between the past and
present. Rather consciousness itself is a discontinuous flick
ering and so implies a different relation between the past and
/I
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present. The present is disconnected from the past and this
vitiates any simple cause-effect relation between them. More
over, the spatial metaphor implied in the writing pad anal
ogy further complicates linear cause-effect relations by in
scribing the past on top of the present. The previous present
is erased by the new present so that each present is simulta
neously discontinuous with the past and yet contingent on its
very erasure. The present maintains its necessary virginity
by complete expulsion of the past; with gross imperialism it
constitutes itself out of the past's exile. Moreover, if the
present is always constituted anew by the deliberate forget
fulness of the past this demonstrates that memory is always
originally repressed, that this repression is what allows con
sciousness to function and that the radical discontinuity of
the subject implies that it too is always reconstituted anew.
Like pure perception, a pure subject" does not exist: we are
written as we write, by the agency within us which always
already keeps watch over perception" (Derrida 226). Thus,
we write ourselves in order to be conscious but this is always
both a deferring of the previous present and the erasure of
ourselves.
But Freud did not .conclude this. Instead, Freud retains
the idea of a subject whose potentially radical discontinuity
is precariously maintained by the intangible concept of an
unconscious retaining these 'permanent traces'. This meta
physics of presence constitutes Freud's greatest betrayal. As
Derrida states: " An unerasable trace is not a trace, it is a full
presence, an immobile and incorruptible substance, a son of
God, a sign of parousia...that is not a mortal germ" (Derrida
230). Freud neglects the fact that the script of dreams and the
mystic pad are only representations and so are static, inferior
analogies rather than the foundations of a science. So on the
one hand, to use de Certeau's happy phrase, Freud radically
"used the dream as a Trojan horse to historicize rhetoric and
reintroduce it into the citadel of science" (de Certeau 23b).
But on the other hand, he kills the metaphor, naturalizes the
unconscious not as hypothetical construct but as fact and so
builds his interpretations and practice on the burial ground
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of catachresis. In other words, Freud performs mythology or
the science of origins. !tis precisely Freud's desire to treat the
unconscious as a first cause that has evinced complaints from
critics. Deleuze/Guattari complain that Freud's need for a
transcendental guarantee imposes the verb 'to be' on these
conjunctions of 'and', 'and, 'and' which is the infinity of
interpretation (Deleuze/Guattari 25). The 'to be' of con
sciousness is complicitous with the metaphysics of presence
which permeates Western philosophy; seeking beginnings
and erecting foundations instead of nullifying them. !tis this
complicity which ties the institutional model of Freudian
thought to psychoanalytic practice as institution.1
This curious Freudian junction involves the intersection
between historicism and fiction. Once again writing history
(individual or social) involves both exile and imperialism or
" cannibalistic discourse" (de Certeau 29b). On the one hand,
the writing process" establishes at the beginning of writing a
separation or exile" (de Certeau 29b). Oedipus begins inter
preting his origins when he realizes that he is exiled from
them. The unknown past pervades his present with a feeling
as uncanny as the hidden 'trace' of the past engraved on his
ankles. Thus the interpretation of origins, this Oedipal
discourse, is founded in absence. Discourse is separated
from its referent just as the 'present' of consciousness is
always constituted by the forgotten past it colonizes (the
writing pad is always erased). On other hand, writing is a
" cannibalistic discourse" which takes the place of the 'history
lost to it" (de Certeau 29b). In other words, dreams are
initially alienated from their meaning because they express
desires mutated by their articulation, nevertheless they also
retain the trace which calls out to us to interpret them. But
when we interpret we also deform the meaning of this trace
and so the historical narration is cannibalistic: explanation
crossesout the origin in order to speak about it. This is where
the betrayal of psychoanalysis occurs. It substitutes the
crossing out, the negation, the acknowledgment of the ab
sence of origin (which is always originally deferred) for
survival under reprieve" (Deleuze/ Guattari 125). The can
JI
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nibalistic discourse equates discourse and reality by impos
ing its discourse as the law governing the real" (de Certeau
32b). Thus, it legitimates its own interpretation - rhetorical,
fictive, itself a vehicle of deferral - by making it 'scientific'.
This is where de Certeau locates institutionalizing ges
ture of psychoanalysis which differs from fiction precisely
because it claims it "might do or become what it says of
writing" (de Certeau 30b). So, if writing is the result of the
negotiation of desire with the censor then to write this nego
tiation is essentially to write and construct the unconscious.
Because there is no palpable origin, there is no way to make
the unconscious conscious without engaging in the original
duplicity of writing. The meaningfulness of the unconscious
is produced, not recouped. But although for both Freud and
a poet such as Schiller there is a loss of knowledge the
outcome is different: "Freud's theoretic production is permit
ted by a loss of knowledge while for Schiller poetic creation
is permitted by a disappearance of being" (de Certeau 30b).
Once again the presence/ absence dichotomy resurfaces. For
Freud the loss of knowledge (exile from origin) avoids the
nihilism and profound antilogos of this complete loss of
'being' through masking its own production. It creates a
discourse that speaks for the referent 'being' which, by the
sleighthand of the psychoanalytic institution's own credibil
ity as curative, is resurrected from the netherworld of noth
ingness. Freud produces 'being', naturalizes iUn the name of
the psychoanalytic institution and then proceeds to inscribe
this 'real' unconscious with a truly 'documentary' history.
This nothingness is, in fact, the hinge that legitimates the
authoritative position of the analyst. He intervenes in the
name of this nothingness and then proceeds to stamp his
historicizing of the unconscious with the mark of reali ty. The
institution qualifies the slide from historicity to epistemic
skepticism (or poetic nothingness) via the authority of his
tory'as it happened'. Historicism which refuses to recognize
its fictiveness dissimula tes itself by the mask of official, grand
history.
/I
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Thus, although Freud ventures into historicism, he re
turns to historiography. But the textual analogies of the
psyche, from the textual content of the psyche in the I nterpre
tation of Dreams to the textual structure of the psyche in the
Mystic Writing Pad have done their work. Freud may have
betrayed his historicizing activities - historicizing rhetoric,
demonstrating the original dissimulation of writing, exceed
ing the phonetic discourse typical of metaphysics,
temporalizing and spatializing writing and the unconscious
- but they, in turn, also betray him. To use Oedipal imagery
against Freud, the son, the offspring of his work in turn
betrays the father. The putative authority of psychoanalysis
is undone by the postulates it needs in order to exist.
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NOTES

1. "The state as a model for the book and for thought has
a long history: logos, the philosopher-king, the transcen
dence of the Idea, the interiority of the concept, the republic
of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought,
man as legislator and as subject" (Deleuze/Guattari 24).

